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I. Introduction. 
 The primary purpose of antitrust – at least, modern antitrust – is to limit the exercise of 
market power.1  By market power we mean the ability of an enterprise/firm to maintain the price 
at which it sells its product at a level that is significantly above its average (unit) costs, when 
“costs” are understood to encompass “opportunity costs” and thus to include a competitive return 
on the investment that has been made in the enterprise.2  In this chapter we will specifically be 
focusing on a “monopoly” or a “dominant firm” as the enterprise that can exercise its market 
power.3
 There are at least seven ways that government policy can limit the ability of an enterprise 
unilaterally to exercise market power: 
 
1) Prevent/stop agreements among firms that restrict competition among them and that 
thereby allow the individual firms to continue to exercise unilateral market power.  An example 
of such an agreement would be an understanding between two firms that Firm A would refrain 
from trying to sell to customers in Firm B’s geographic territory (or to Firm B’s particular 
category of customers), and vice versa. 
2) Prevent/stop mergers that would otherwise allow the merged firm to exercise market 
power (where the separate entities previously did not exercise market power) or that would 
otherwise allow a firm with market power to enhance that power. 
                                                 
1 This chapter will have an unavoidable United States orientation, since U.S. antitrust policy is what the author 
knows best.  Indeed, we will use the word “antitrust”, rather than the phrase “competition policy”:  The former is a 
more common U.S. usage; the latter is more commonly used outside of the U.S.  Nevertheless, the basic ideas that 
are developed in this chapter have widespread applications in the international contexts that this Handbook 
encompasses, although the specific instances discussed in the chapter will be U.S.-oriented. 
2 By using this definition, we will try to sidestep what – at least to this author – appears to be an uninteresting 
discussion as to whether there is a useful distinction between “market power” and “monopoly power”. 
3 We will thus leave the discussion of the collective exercise of market power by a group of firms – whether they are 
explicitly colluding or, in the case of a small number of firms (“oligopoly”), implicitly recognizing their 
interdependence – to other chapters in this Handbook.  In addition, most of the concepts that are developed with 
respect to “monopoly” in this chapter would apply in a similar fashion to an enterprise that acts as a single buyer – a 
monopsonist – that exercises its market power vis-à-vis the sellers that it faces.  But, again, we will leave that 
discussion to other chapters in this Handbook. 
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 3) Prevent/stop predatory behavior by a firm that can enhance its market power by 
driving rivals out of the market.4
 4) Prevent/stop exclusionary behavior by a firm that can enhance its market power by 
thereby disadvantaging its rivals; such behavior is often described as “raising rivals’ costs”.
 
5
 5) Dismember the firm, so as to create multiple competitive entities where there was a 
single seller before, so that the competitive behavior of the created firms reduces or eliminates 
the original firm’s market power.  This is often described as a “structural” approach to 
addressing issues of market power. 
 
 6) Regulate the firm that possesses market power – e.g., by specifying a maximum price 
that approximates the firm’s average costs and/or limiting the extent to which the firm charges 
different prices to different customers for essentially the same item (i.e., price discrimination). 
 7) Replacing the firm with a public enterprise that would charge a price that is closer to 
the firm’s average costs (on the assumption that the government enterprise’s costs would be the 
same as the private firm’s costs).6
 The first five of these alternatives are part of antitrust policy and will be discussed in this 
chapter.  Discussions of regulation and of government enterprise will be left to other Handbooks, 
although there are chapters in this Handbook that address the intersection of antitrust and these 
other two policies.
 
7
                                                 
4 Although, in principle, a firm that previously lacks market power might engage in predatory or exclusionary 
behavior and thereby acquire market power, by far the most common allegations are that a firm that already has 
market power has engaged in predatory and/or exclusionary actions so as to enhance its market power (or to prevent 
its erosion). 
 
5 See Salop and Scheffman (1983, 1987). 
6 A variant on this approach would be to establish a public enterprise that would compete with the firm. 
7 In principle, “antitrust” could be broadly defined to encompass judicial decisions that would cause judges to 
become the regulators of the prices that firms with market power are allowed to charge.  But, for the most part, U.S. 
antitrust policy has not gone in that direction.  One exception might be Section 2 of the Clayton Act, which, after its 
strengthening in the 1930s, has come to be known as the Robinson-Patman Act.  The Robinson-Patman Act attempts 
to restrict the ability of firms to practice price discrimination.  However, enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act 
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 This chapter will proceed as follows:  First, we will present the standard textbook 
treatments of monopoly and the dominant firm and discuss the non-trivial issues of what 
constitutes a real-world monopoly (or dominant firm) and how one would go about identifying it.  
With that as a foundation, we will then address the five categories of antitrust policy that were 
listed above.  A brief conclusion will follow. 
 
II. Monopoly and the dominant firm: conceptual and real-world issues. 
 A monopoly is the sole seller of a distinctive product (or service).  Note that a monopolist 
need not be the sole seller of everything in an economy; it only needs to be the sole seller of 
something that is sufficiently distinctive (and that it is sold in large enough volumes that it is 
worth noticing8
A. A simple monopoly framework. 
).  There may be partial or imperfect substitutes for the item; but it does need to 
be distinct.  For example, if a single enterprise was the sole producer and seller of all beef in the 
U.S., then it is likely that most observers (except, perhaps, the owners of the firm, and their 
antitrust lawyers) would consider this enterprise to be a monopoly, even though lamb and pork 
and chicken, as well as non-meat foodstuffs, would be considered to be partial substitutes for 
beef. 
Perhaps the easiest way to conceptualize the ability of a monopoly to exercise market 
power is to start with a distinctive item that has no substitutes, as in the following:  Suppose that 
there are a 10 million potential customers for a distinctive item that will be called a “gadget”.  
Each customer is willing to buy, at most, a single gadget each week; and each customer has a 
maximum willingness to pay (each week) for a gadget of $10.00.  At a price of even $10.01, all 
                                                                                                                                                             
by the federal antitrust enforcement agencies has effectively disappeared; and even private suits under the Act today 
are relatively rare. 
8 This is an issue to which we will return below. 
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10 million customers would refuse to buy; at a price of $10.00 or less per gadget, all 10 million 
customers will each buy one gadget (per week).  The “demand curve” for gadgets in this 
example is portrayed in Figure 14-1, where the quantity of gadgets per week is measured on the 
horizontal axis and dollar amounts (prices and costs) are measured on the vertical axis. 
 Suppose that the unit costs (including a normal profit9
 If there is a single producer/seller of gadgets that wishes to maximize its profits, then it is 
clear that the price that will do so is $10/gadget; this is represented in Figure 14-1 as PM.  The 
monopolist would sell 10 million gadgets per week; and, since its unit costs are $6/gadget, the 
monopolist’s (above-normal) profits would be $40 million per week; in Figure 14-1 these profits 
are represented by the rectangle PMyxPC.  Any higher price would cause all of the customers to 
refrain from buying; any lower price would “leave money on the table,” since no additional 
customers would be induced to buy.  At $10/gadget, the monopolist would be “charging what the 
market would bear.”
 on the investment in the firm) of 
producing gadgets – regardless of the volume produced per week – are $6 per gadget.  These are 
also represented on Figure 14-1. 
10
 By contrast, if there were multiple firms that each produced identical gadgets
 
11
                                                 
9 By this we mean the profit on the investment in the firm that could otherwise be earned in a competitive industry. 
 and that 
competed on the basis of price, the equilibrium price would be only $6 per gadget (which is 
represented as PC in Figure 14-1).  At any higher price, one or more of the competitive firms 
would find it worthwhile to charge a price that was closer to $6, in the hopes of attracting all of 
the customers while still charging a price that yielded profits that were above those that were 
already embedded in the unit costs; any price that was lower than $6 per gadget would not be 
10 In more technical terms, at a price of $10, the demand relationship experiences infinite elasticity with respect to 
price at any higher price and zero elasticity at any lower price. 
11 Note that a gadget is still distinct from all other goods and services; but, since each producer/seller’s gadget is 
identical to all other producer/sellers’ gadgets, they are all selling “commodity” gadgets. 
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worthwhile, since a seller would not thereby be covering its full costs (again, including full 
opportunity costs), unless the seller hoped that it could thereby permanently drive out its rivals 
and emerge as an unchallenged monopolist (which could charge $10 per gadget, etc.); so long as 
it is easy for firms to enter and exit the gadget industry, this last expectation would be unlikely to 
be held.12
 It is clear, then, that the monopolist’s profits have come at the expense of consumers.  If 
competition prevails, consumers would be able to buy at a price of $6 the gadgets that they value 
at $10, and they enjoy a “consumer’s surplus” of $4/gadget, which aggregated across all 
consumers would be represented by the rectangle PMyxPC in Figure 14-1; if monopoly prevails, 
consumers pay the full $10/gadget, and the consumers’ surplus that they enjoyed under 
competition is transferred to the monopolist and is the source of the latter’s profits. 
 
 Further, it is clear that if consumers valued gadgets at $12 each, the monopolist’s profits 
would be yet higher; if consumers’ valuation of gadgets were only $8, the monopolist’s profits 
would be lower; but at either valuation, the competitive price would still be $6/gadget.  Thus, 
while the monopolist is able to charge “what the market will bear” (i.e., the maximum that 
consumers are willing to pay), the competitive price will be anchored at the competitive 
industry’s costs (so long as the supply of gadgets can be expanded at the constant unit costs of 
$6/gadget). 
B. The “Lerner Index”. 
 One convenient way of measuring and representing the market power of an enterprise is 
provided by the so-called “Lerner Index”,13
                                                 
12 We will discuss below the issues that surround “predatory pricing”, where the claim is that a firm has deliberately 
tried to drive rivals out of the market. 
 which is written as: 
13  Since Lerner (1934) was the first to popularize this formulation of market power, this is often called the Lerner 
index; for some historical perspective, see Elzinga and Mills (2011).  Lerner also popularized the relationship by 
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L = (P – MC)/P,     (14.1) 
where L is the indicator of market power, P is the price at which the firm sells its output, and MC 
is the marginal cost of the firm for the volume of output that the firm is selling.14
C. A somewhat more complex monopoly example. 
  For the 
monopolist, L will always be a positive number that approaches 1.0 as P gets larger relative to 
MC.  In the example above, when the monopolist charges $10/gadget, L = 0.67; whereas, for the 
competitive firms discussed above, L = 0. 
 Let us now suppose that the demand structure for gadgets is more complex than the 
simple example above.  Suppose instead that various buyers have different willingnesses to pay 
for their single gadget per week and/or some buyers may be willing to buy larger numbers of 
gadgets per week when the price of gadgets is lower.  Thus, at higher prices fewer gadgets would 
be bought, while at lower prices more gadgets would be bought.  A linear representation of this 
“sloped” demand relationship (designated as D) is provided in Figure 14-2.15
 The monopolist’s problem is now more complex:  There is no single price that represents 
“what the market will bear”.  If the monopolist again seeks to maximize its profits and can 
charge only a single price to its customers – i.e., it cannot practice price discrimination by 
charging a high price to some of its customers (who have a high willingness to pay for gadgets) 
while simultaneously charging a lower price to other customers (who have a lower willingness to 
pay) – then it faces a tradeoff:  The monopolist could sell gadgets at a very high price (and have 
  Again, we will 
assume that the costs of producing gadgets involve constant unit costs, regardless of volume. 
                                                                                                                                                             
showing that L = (P – MC)/P = -1/ε, where ε is the own-price elasticity of demand for the firm’s product.  This last 
relationship can be derived from the first-order condition for a firm to maximize its profits.  It is worth noting that it 
appears that Lerner’s derivation was apparently preceded by a similar derivation of this relationship by Amoroso 
(1930); see Keppler (1994) and Giocoli (2012). 
14 In the numerical example above, the firm’s marginal costs are equal to its average or unit costs. 
15 This is the standard diagrammatic representation of monopoly, which appears in virtually all microeconomics 
textbooks. 
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high per-unit margins), but would sell comparatively few per week; or the monopolist could sell 
gadgets at a comparatively low price and sell many more per week, but its margins would be 
slim. 
 The quantitative solution to the monopolist’s problem – what price to charge (or, 
equivalently, what quantity to sell), so as to maximize its profits – requires the use of simple 
calculus:  If the monopolist’s profits are represented by π, its price by P, the quantity 
produced/sold by Q, and its costs of producing the requisite gadgets as C, then: 
    π = PxQ – C ;     (14.2) 
and taking the derivative of this equation with respect to the quantity to be sold (or with respect 
to the price to sell it at) yields the result that the monopolist should sell a quantity of gadgets 
each week such that the marginal revenue (MR) from selling a slightly larger (or slightly 
smaller) quantity is equal to the marginal cost (MC) of producing that quantity; or 
    MR = MC   .      (14.3) 
This outcome is shown geometrically in Figure 14-2, where QM represents the quantity at which 
MR = MC, and PM represents the price at which that quantity can be sold.  The monopolist’s 
(maximized) profits can again be represented by the rectangle PMyxPC. 
 Further, it is straightforward to demonstrate that an implication of MR = MC is that the 
monopolist’s profit-maximizing price bears the following relationship to its marginal costs and to 
the elasticity of demand (ε):16
    PM = MC/(1 + 1/ε)   .     (14.4) 
 
                                                 
16 Where elasticity of demand is defined as the percentage change in quantity that accompanies a given percentage 
change in price; this is expected to be a negative number, since a price increase will cause a quantity decrease, and 
conversely. 
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Thus, the monopolist’s profit-maximizing price will be higher when its marginal costs are higher 
and when its demand is less elastic (i.e., the quantity demanded is less responsive to price 
changes).  The monopolist will thereby be interested in reducing its costs and in undertaking 
actions (e.g., advertising and other forms of marketing and promotion) that expand the demand 
for gadgets but also that make the demand less elastic (e.g., that instills in buyers a stronger sense 
of “Gotta have it!”).17
Also, as was noted above, from equation 14.4, the Lerner Index can be shown to be equal 
to: 
 
    L = (P – MC)/P = -1/ε    .    (14.5) 
The Lerner Index thus indicates that the monopolist is exercising more market power when its 
demand curve is less elastic. 
 In contrast to the monopolist, a competitive group of sellers that each sold identical 
gadgets and faced the same aggregate demand for gadgets and the same cost structure as does the 
monopolist would sell gadgets at an equilibrium price of PC. and would sell (in aggregate) a 
quantity QC.  These are illustrated in Figure 14-2 as well.  Thus, the competitive industry sells at 
a lower price (again, anchored to its costs of production) and sells a larger aggregate volume.  
Further, the loss to consumers from the replacement of competition with monopoly is now more 
complex:  In addition to the transfer of consumer surplus from buyers to the monopolist 
(rectangle PMyxPC), there is also the loss of consumer surplus by buyers who would have bought 
gadgets at the competitive price PC but whose willingness to pay for gadgets is less than PM.  
These gadget purchases (represented in Figure 14-2 by the distance QC – QM) simply aren’t 
made; the buyers instead buy other (lesser valued) things; and the aggregated lost value to these 
                                                 
17 However, as Eq. 14.4 makes clear, so long as the monopolist’s marginal costs are positive, the profit-maximizing 
price-quantity combination will be in the “elastic” portion of the firm’s demand curve; i.e., where |ε| > 1.0. 
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shut-out buyers – the social inefficiency of monopoly – can be approximately represented by the 
area of the triangle yzx. 
 And, again, the Lerner Index will show a positive value for the monopolist, while 
showing a value of L = 0 for the competitive group of sellers. 
D. The dominant firm and the reactive fringe. 
 There appear to be industries where there is not a single-firm monopoly, but there is 
nevertheless a dominant firm with an apparent market share that exceeds 50% and a number of 
smaller firms that account for smaller shares.18
 If the other firms in the industry are few and have noticeable market shares, then strategic 
behavior among them is likely to prevail; and that puts the structure of the industry into the 
category of “oligopoly,” which is not the topic for this chapter.  However, if the other firms are 
small and reactive (rather than strategic), a model that retains the basic features of monopoly can 
emerge.
  Modern examples would appear to be Google in 
on-line search; Intel in microprocessors; Apple in tablets; eBay in on-line auctions; and 
Microsoft in personal computer operating systems.  Older examples would include AT&T in 
long-distance telephone service; Alcoa in aluminum; IBM in mainframe computers; Xerox in 
photocopy machines; and Kodak in film and cameras. 
19
 Suppose that there is a enterprise that has a special production advantage – say, exclusive 
access to a superior technology – that allows it to produce a distinctive product (that we will 
again call a “gadget”) at lower costs than can other firms.  In Figure 14-3 we represent the 
(sloped) market demand for gadgets per week and the enterprise’s costs of producing gadgets 
  That dominant firm model can be described as follows: 
                                                 
18 What constitutes the “market” and hence how to measure “market shares” is an important but subtle point to 
which we will return below. 
19 This model is generally attributed to Stigler (1940), with revivals by Saving (1970) and Landes and Posner 
(1981); for a discussion, see Elzinga and Mills (2011).  However, it appears that Amaroso (1938) preceded even 
Stigler; see Giocoli (2012). 
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(which we again portray, for the purposes of expositional simplicity, as a horizontal line of 
constant unit costs, regardless of volume). 
If the firm were the sole seller of gadgets, then the analysis would revert to that of Figure 
14-2.  However, there are a number of other firms that can also produce (identical) gadgets, but 
at higher costs than is true for the enterprise with the special technology (which, from this point 
forward, we will describe as the “dominant” firm).  We will assume that these fringe firms are 
reactive, in the following sense:  Rather than acting strategically, these firms simply react to a 
perceived price in the marketplace by supplying a quantity of gadgets that is consistent with 
simple (non-strategic) profit-maximizing behavior: the quantity at which their marginal costs 
(MC) are equal to their marginal revenue (MR), which in turn is equal to the price; i.e., the 
quantity at which P = MR = MC.  The aggregate supply of gadgets that would be available from 
the reactive fringe firms at various prices is also portrayed in Figure 14-3.20
 In order to maximize its profits, the dominant firm has to take the fringe’s reactive supply 
into account in formulating its pricing decision.
 
21  One possibility would be to practice “limit 
pricing”: to set a price that is just below the level that would begin to induce a supply response 
by the fringe.  In Figure 14-3, this would be price PL, and the consequent profits would be 
represented by rectangle PLwvPC.22
However, as a general matter, a superior strategy for the dominant firm is to treat the 
supply by the fringe as a “given” feature of the market.  In essence, the fringe’s supply of 
 
                                                 
20 We will also assume that entry by the fringe firms (or their equivalents) is sufficiently easy, so that they cannot be 
permanently driven from the marketplace by a sustained period of low pricing by the dominant firm. 
21 Of course, if the fringe firms’ costs were so high that they were not a realistic challenge to the dominant firm (i.e., 
if point PL is sufficiently far up the vertical axis), then the dominant firm can simply ignore them, and the analysis 
reverts to that of Figure 14-2 and the unhindered monopolist. 
22 If the price of PL would cause the fringe to go out of business and no other firms would replace them, then the 
dominant firm would subsequently have the entire market to itself and would thus be able to charge the unfettered 
monopoly price.  For the remainder of the discussion of the dominant firm we will assume that the fringe cannot be 
permanently driven from the marketplace.  In Section III we will address the issue of “predatory pricing”, whereby a 
firm is alleged to try to drive rivals permanently out of the market. 
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gadgets unavoidably subtracts from the demand that is available to the dominant firm.  The 
dominant firm thus has available to it a “residual demand”: the aggregate market demand at 
every price, minus the fringe’s supply at that price.  It is with respect to this residual demand 
curve (which is portrayed in Figure 14-3) that the dominant firm should calculate its marginal 
revenue and thus arrive at the quantity (and price) at which MR = MC.  In Figure 14-3 this is 
indicated by QD and PD, and the dominant firm’s profits are indicated by rectangle PDyxPC.  At 
the price PD, the aggregate market demand is larger than QD, and the remainder is supplied by the 
fringe. 
Finally, if the dominant firm’s production technology were somehow readily available to 
a group of competitive firms, the outcome would again be PC and QC.  So, again, the dominant 
firm (as a quasi-monopolist) causes the price to be higher and the quantity sold lower than if full 
competition (using the superior technology) could prevail. 
 Thus despite the presence of the fringe (or, equivalently, because of the technological 
limits faced by the fringe), the dominant firm – though technically not a “monopolist”, since it is 
not the sole seller of gadgets – still maximizes its profits on the basis of an unambiguous MR = 
MC calculation; perhaps “quasi-monopolist” would be an appropriate descriptor.  However, what 
this portrayal does highlight is that the dominant firm’s profits are limited by the fringe firms.  If 
the fringe were absent (so that the dominant firm had the entire market demand to itself) or the 
fringe were weaker (in the sense that the fringe firms’ costs were higher, so that the dominant 
firm had more of the aggregate market for itself), the dominant firm could charge a higher price, 
its market power (as measured by the Lerner Index) would be greater, and its profits would be 
larger.  Accordingly, the dominant firm would be interested in undertaking activities that would 
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raise the costs of its fringe competitors or would otherwise make their economic life more 
difficult.23
Finally, although the dominant firm model that was described above was based on a the 
dominant firm’s superior cost technology in producing a generic item that is readily replicable 
(but at higher costs) by other firms, the same intuitive idea should carry over to a model of 
branded (and thus differentiated) goods or services:  There could be a firm with a strong brand 
that is able to garner a large market share in a particular consumer goods category – say, laundry 
detergent – and a fringe of smaller firms with weaker brands (and that may or may not have the 
same production costs as the dominant firm).  Based on the relative strength of its brand, the 
dominant firm would be able to charge higher prices and earn higher profits than could the 
fringe.  And the dominant firm would be interested in measures that could weaken the fringe and 
thereby strengthen the market power of the dominant firm. 
  We will return to this point in our discussion of antitrust policy below. 
E. How does monopoly arise? 
 We have already indicated that a monopoly must be selling an item that is distinctive.  It 
would be a contradiction in terms to describe a “monopoly” as one among a number of firms that 
are all selling the same product.  Indeed, for the dominant firm model that was just discussed, we 
acknowledged that “monopoly” was not quite right and suggested “quasi-monopoly”.  But more 
than just distinctiveness is needed. 
 That “more” – as Bain (1956) recognized – are barriers to entry:  Without barriers to 
entry, the above-normal profits of the monopolist could not persist.  Potential sellers of the same 
or a closely similar product that are otherwise equally situated would be attracted by those 
above-normal profits, and their additional supply would cause the equilibrium price to fall.  So 
                                                 
23 This would also be true, of course, if the dominant firm faces just a few rivals who act strategically. 
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long as the prospects of above-normal profits remained, entry would continue to occur.  Only 
when the price was driven down to the level of PC would entry cease. 
 There are basically three categories of entry barriers: 
 1. Ownership of a unique resource.  The ownership of a unique resource constitutes one 
important potential barrier to entry.  Examples would include: a) a unique mineral deposit or 
other natural resource; b) a unique government franchise (e.g., the right to be the sole provider of 
local taxicab services); c) an especially distinctive patent;24 or an especially distinctive 
production technology.25
 2. Economies of scale.  If the technology of an industry is such that economies of scale – 
i.e., that the unit costs of production are always lower at higher rates of production per unit of 
time than at lower rates
  This last category is the foundation for the dominant firm model that 
was discussed above. 
26
                                                 
24 With respect to patents:  There is a long and unfortunate legal history of describing all patents (and other forms of 
“intellectual property”, such as copyrights and trademarks) as “monopolies”.  Since the U.S. alone currently issues 
almost 200,000 patents each year (and has issued over seven million patents since the beginning of the U.S. patent 
system in 1789), “monopoly” cannot be a useful descriptor for all patents.  Instead, recognizing them as distinctive 
pieces of property – of which only some (probably only a relative few) each year are sufficiently distinctive that 
“monopoly” may be a useful descriptor for those patents – is a superior framework. 
 – then a single firm (a “natural monopoly”) that supplies the market 
would be able to do so most efficiently from a production cost standpoint (i.e., with the lowest 
unit costs).  Figure 14-4 provides an example of the cost curves that would follow from a 
production technology that exhibits economies of scale and thus would yield a “natural 
monopoly”:  In this example there is an unavoidable (and sizable) fixed cost per period and 
constant marginal costs over all ranges of production.  Since the fixed costs (by definition) do 
25 This distinctive technology might be based on a specific patent; or it could be based on non-patented but not 
easily replicated “know how” or trade secrets. 
26 Economies of scale are conceptually distinct from the advantages of being able to exploit a “learning curve” (or 
“experience curve”, or “learning by doing”).  The former involves lower unit costs’ being associated with higher 
volumes per period of time and are generally reversible; the latter involve lower unit costs that arise because of 
accumulated production volume over multiple time periods and is generally irreversible (unless the accumulated 
learning is somehow forgotten).  Another way of thinking about the lower costs that occur as a consequence of a 
learning curve is that they are akin to the lower costs that arise as a consequence of technological innovation with 
respect to production processes. 
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not vary with output, the average fixed costs (AFC) are lower when volumes are higher (i.e., the 
fixed costs are “spread” over more units); and thus unit costs (or “average costs” [AC], which are 
the sum of the constant marginal costs27 and the falling average fixed costs) are lower when 
volumes are higher.28
 3. The size and “sunkenness” of needed investments.  If entry into an activity requires a 
relatively large investment and that investment has no good alternative uses (i.e., the costs are 
“sunk”), then potential entrants would consider such entry to be quite risky.  Examples of such 
investments include a large investment in specialized machinery; substantial research and 
development (R&D) expenditures that may not yield useful results; and large advertising and 
other promotional expenditures that are lost if unsuccessful.  By contrast, if the necessary 
expenditure is modest in magnitude and, if spent on a tangible item, that item has a viable 
secondary market, the barriers to entry would be low.  Monopoly would be more likely to arise 
in the former circumstance than in the latter. 
 
 The ability of the monopoly to exploit its market power (as measured by the Lerner 
index) would depend, as before, on the monopoly’s costs and the elasticity of market demand but 
now also on the extent to which other firms are disadvantaged by these barriers (e.g., the extent 
of the cost disadvantage that a firm faces from the dis-economies of smaller scale if it tries to 
enter at a small scale) as well as (for small numbers strategic situations) the potential entrants’ 
conjectures as to how the monopolist would react to their entry.29
F. Does a positive Lerner Index necessarily mean “market power”? 
 
                                                 
27 Constant marginal costs, as portrayed in Figure 14-4 imply constant average variable costs of the same magnitude; 
and it is really the sum of average fixed costs and average variable costs that yield unit costs. 
28 Even if at some comparatively high volume the difficulties of managing a large enterprise might introduce dis-
economies of scale, so long as the size of the market is smaller than that volume, a monopoly would still be the most 
efficient framework for that market. 
29 See, for example, Modigliani (1958) and Sylos-Labini (1962). 
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 As was discussed above, the standard indicator of market power, at least by economists, 
has come to be the Lerner Index.30
 However, a rigid use of the Lerner Index as an indicator of market power – and thus as an 
indicator of potential (likely?) antitrust concern – immediately becomes problematic when we 
move away from a simple world where all of the competitive firms in an industry are selling 
identical (homogeneous) commodity products; at best, this condition of homogeneity among 
sellers would roughly apply to sellers for primary agricultural and mineral commodities.  Outside 
of these two areas, products (and services) tend to be non-homogeneous.  With non-
homogeneity, the product and the seller are distinctive:  In deciding from which seller to buy 
which product, buyers care about more than just which seller has the lowest price.  They care 
about the attributes of the product and of the seller. 
  For the stylized examples that we have employed thus far, 
the Lerner Index would serve as a good guide for considerations of antitrust policy:  The gadget 
monopolist (and the dominant firm) has a positive Lerner Index; the competitive industry (that is 
producing and selling commodity gadgets) would have a Lerner Index that is equal to zero. 
The direct implication is that the demand curve that faces each distinctive seller has a 
negative slope (rather than being horizontal from the perspective of the competitive seller in an 
industry that is selling a homogeneous product, where only price matters to buyers).  In turn, this 
will mean that the profit-maximizing output for the distinctive seller will be a level of output 
where P > MR = MC; and, thus, for this firm, L > 0:  The Lerner Index indicates that the firm has 
market power.  But if there are a large number of somewhat similar but still distinctive sellers 
that are competing with each other (with respect to price and with respect to other attributes) 
and/or entry by such firms (i.e., somewhat similar but still distinctive) is relatively easy, then the 
                                                 
30 See, for example, Motta (2004, p. 41), Carlton and Perloff (2005), Perloff et al. (2007), and Tremblay and 
Tremblay (2012). 
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typical distinctive firm will earn only normal profits (despite the fact that P > MR = MC and thus 
L > 0).  This outcome was first recognized separately and independently by Chamberlin (1933) 
and Robinson (1933):  Chamberlin described the phenomenon as “monopolistic competition”; 
Robinson termed it “imperfect competition”. 
Chamberlin’s geometry, which showed this result, is reproduced in modified form in 
Figure 14-5:  The typical distinctive firm has a downward sloping demand curve, denoted as D 
(and a concomitant marginal revenue curve, denoted as MR), and a cost structure that exhibits 
economies of scale over at least part of its range of volume (in Figure 14-5, the cost structure of 
pervasive economies of scale from Figure 14-4 has been used).  The figure shows the 
equilibrium conditions for the typical distinctive firm that faces competition from other 
distinctive firms: P = AC (the firm is earning normal profits); MR = MC (the firm is maximizing 
profits); and P > MR = MC (the Lerner Index is positive).  If the typical firm were earning 
above-normal profits (i.e., P > AC), entry would occur, which would encroach on the firm’s sales 
(i.e., its demand curve would shift down and to the left) and push it toward normal profits; if the 
firm were earning below-normal profits, some firms would exit, leaving more potential 
customers for the remaining firms (the typical firm’s demand curve would move up and to the 
right) and again push it toward normal profits. 
 The landscapes of most market economies are dominated by myriad distinctive firms that 
produce and sell distinctive (branded) products and services – whether as manufacturers or as 
services providers or as retailers.  Although there may be some definitional rigor to the 
attachment of the concept of “market power” to such firms, it makes little intuitive sense to 
identify the corner delicatessen or the neighborhood kitchen remodeler or a small machine shop 
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with the term “market power”.  To do so risks either trivializing the concept or – in the context of 
public policy – greatly overstating the realistic domain of public policy concerns.31
 Consequently, unless otherwise noted, the remainder of this chapter will describe “market 
power” as applying to instances where the size of the enterprise is large enough to warrant 
special attention from public policy: i.e., “significant” market power.
 
32
 
  We will thus remain in 
the traditional domain of “monopoly” and “dominant firm” that is associated with Figures 14-2 
and 14-3. 
III. Antitrust Policy with Respect to Monopoly and the Dominant Firm. 
 As was discussed in the Introduction, there are at least five ways that antitrust policy can 
limit the ability of an enterprise unilaterally to exercise market power.  This section will discuss 
those policies.  Before doing so, however, there is a threshold issue that must be addressed: 
market delineation. 
A. A threshold issue: market delineation. 
 If “market power” is at issue in an antitrust proceeding, then generally there will need to 
be some specification of the “market” within which the “market power” has been or will be 
exercised.  The exception is “hard core” price fixing and similar collusive arrangements that are 
prosecuted under Section 1 of the Sherman Act:  These are treated as “per se” violations, in 
which the plaintiff need show only that the actions occurred and need not show effects (which 
                                                 
31 See Pepall et al. (2008, pp. 53-54) for similar concerns over the use of the Lerner index as a mis-representation of 
“market power”. 
32 This recognition that there must be some relative size threshold for realistic considerations of “market power” can 
also be found in Fisher (2008) and Baker (2008).  It is possible, however, that even with a size threshold, a large 
firm with a positive Lerner index might be just a large-scale version of the Chamberlin-Robinson firm of Figure 14-
5.  Areeda and Hovenkamp (2002, p. 133) state that “Market power need not trouble the antitrust authorities unless 
it is both substantial in magnitude and durable.”  However, their subsequent discussion indicates that “magnitude” 
refers to the deviation between price and marginal cost, and not the size of the enterprise. 
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would likely require the specification of a market).  In all other antitrust cases, a relevant market 
will need to be delineated.33
 The needed specification of the market can arise in two broad contexts: a) A proposed 
action – e.g., a proposed merger – might threaten to create market power where it hadn’t 
previously existed (or it could enhance/exacerbate market power that already exists); or b) An 
enterprise is accused of actions that are manifestations of its already existing market power.  We 
will address each, in turn. 
 
 1. Market delineation to deal with a proposed action.  Proposed mergers are the most 
common context in which the potential creation or enhancement of market power arises, and 
merger analysis will provide a convenient basis for the discussion of this approach to market 
delineation.34
 The goal of antitrust merger enforcement is to prevent mergers that would create or 
enhance market power.  The delineation of a relevant market – in product “space” and in 
geographic space – is essential for the analysis that should underlie merger enforcement 
decisions. 
 
 Since 198235
                                                 
33 Often this is described as “market definition”. 
 the U.S. Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division (DOJ) and the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) have been using a set of “Merger Guidelines” (which have been 
updated periodically, the last such revision occurring in 2010) that have at their heart a market 
delineation paradigm that runs as follows:  Suppose that the analyst starts with a “candidate” 
market that consists of (at least) the two firms that are proposing to merge.  The analyst then 
addresses the following question:  If all of the sellers of the candidate market were combined into 
34 Since other chapters in this Handbook deal more extensively with merger policy, the discussion here will 
necessarily be brief. 
35 An earlier set of Merger Guidelines had been issued by the DOJ in 1968; however, the approach to market 
delineation those Guidelines did not prove satisfactory or lasting. 
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a single firm (a “hypothetical monopolist”), could that firm achieve a “small but significant and 
non-transitory increase in price” (SSNIP) above the current price (or above the level at which the 
price would otherwise be)?  If the answer to this question is “yes”, then this is a relevant market; 
if the answer is “no” (because too many buyers would turn to other sellers of the same or similar 
items, so as to thwart the attempt to raise the price), then the candidate market must be widened 
(by including more sellers) until the answer is “yes”.  Generally, the smallest relevant market 
will be the one that serves as the basis for further analysis of the merger.  Price increases of 5% 
or 10% have usually been used as the measure of “significant” in SSNIP. 
 In essence, the paradigm rests on the idea that a relevant market is one in which market 
power could be exercised (by the “hypothetical monopolist”).36
 The market delineation paradigm that was just described was originally developed for the 
analysis of the possible creation of market power through (what is now described as) 
“coordinated effects”; earlier generations of economists would have described this as implicit 
“oligopolistic coordination”.  Thus, the merger analysis was focused on the prevention of the 
creation or enhancement of market power that would be jointly exercised by a group of 
oligopolists.  Unless the relevant market happened to encompass just the two merging firms (and 
thus the merger was a “2-to-1” merger), it would not directly address the issue of the creation of 
  Then subsequent stages of the 
analysis – by examining the market shares of the merging parties and of other major sellers in the 
relevant market, the change in market shares that would occur as a direct (pro forma) 
consequence of the merger; the conditions of entry; the buyers’ side of the market; etc. – try to 
determine whether the merger that has been proposed is likely to result in the creation or 
enhancement of market power. 
                                                 
36 Although this paradigm was first used in the DOJ 1982 Merger Guidelines, the concept appears to have first been 
developed by Adelman (1959b); see Werden (2003). 
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market power that could be exercised unilaterally.  Nevertheless, the hypothetical monopolist 
paradigm is valuable for the purposes at hand for the following reason:  If one thinks of the 
group of coordinating oligopolists as trying to emulate a monopolist, then the hypothetical 
monopolist provides an analytical basis for antitrust enforcement that can limit this emulation. 
 Since 1992, the Merger Guidelines have also encompassed an analytical approach to 
addressing problems of “unilateral effects”:  These problems arise when the two merging firms 
sell differentiated products that compete with each other.  To the extent that there are customers 
of one of the firms that have considered the merger partner’s products to be their best second 
choice, the merger eliminates the restraint that each firm exercised on the other firm’s ability to 
raise prices.  Thus, the merger will allow the merged firm unilaterally to raise its prices.37
 In principle, a market delineation analysis is not needed for this approach.  There only 
needs to be a finding (which would have to be based on solid empirical analysis) that significant 
unilateral effects would arise as a consequence of the merger.  Or, if it were felt that there must 
be a delineation of a market for there to be a finding that the post-merger firm would be able to 
exercise greater market power, then (tautologically) the finding that the merged firm has the 
ability unilaterally to increase its price (if that increase exceeds a SSNIP threshold) must mean 
that the two prospective merger partners comprise a relevant market for that product. 
 
 2. Market delineation to assess whether a firm already posses market power.  In a typical 
antitrust lawsuit in which a firm is being accused of actions that have monopolized or have 
attempted to monopolize an industry,38
                                                 
37 More detail on this approach will be provided below. 
 the plaintiff has to demonstrate that the defendant 
possesses market power; without the possession of market power, the defendant’s actions would 
be unlikely to have significant consequences.  Consequently, again, a relevant market must again 
38 Recall that Section 2 of the Sherman Act does not forbid “monopoly”; instead it forbids actions that “monopolize, 
or attempt to monopolize…”. 
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be delineated.  Not surprisingly, the plaintiff will want to claim that the relevant market is narrow 
and that the defendant’s sales constitute a large share of that market (and that entry is difficult, 
etc.), which would be a strong indicator that the defendant possessed market power; the 
defendant, of course, will want to claim the opposite: that the market is quite broad and that the 
defendant has only a small share (and that entry is easy, etc.) and doesn’t/can’t exercise market 
power. 
 A famous example of this type of issue arose in the antitrust suit by the DOJ against du 
Pont in the 1950s, alleging monopolization of cellophane.39  The DOJ alleged that the relevant 
market was narrow: cellophane; du Pont claimed that the market was much broader and 
encompassed all flexible wrapping materials.  More recently, in the DOJ’s monopolization suit 
against Microsoft in the late 1990s40 the DOJ argued that the relevant market was operating 
systems for Intel-compatible personal computers; Microsoft argued for a wider delineation that 
would have encompassed all software on all platforms for computing (including applications 
running on servers).  Yet more recently, in the DOJ’s antitrust suit against Visa and MasterCard 
in the early 2000s that alleged monopolization of credit card issuance,41
 Which perspectives were valid? 
 the DOJ argued for a 
narrow market of credit and charge cards; Visa and MasterCard argued for a broader payments 
market that also included debit cards, checks, and cash. 
 Unfortunately, the market delineation paradigm that works well for the Merger 
Guidelines approach to “coordinated effects” merger cases generally doesn’t apply to such 
monopolization cases.  The Merger Guidelines paradigm addresses a prospective merger and the 
                                                 
39 See U.S. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956); for discussion, see Stocking and Mueller 
(1955). 
40 See U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (2001); for discussion, see, e.g., Rubinfeld (2009). 
41 See U.S. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc. Visa International Corp., and MasterCard International Inc., 344 F.3d 229 (2003); 
for discussion, see Pindyck (2009). 
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possibility that this prospective merger might create or enhance market power as a consequence 
of the completion of the merger. 
 By contrast, in the context of a monopolization case, the goal is usually to try to 
determine whether the defendant currently has market power.  The use of the SSNIP test – 
asking whether the defendant could profitably raise its price from current levels – ought to be 
useless:  If the firm is maximizing its profits, the answer ought always to be “no”, regardless of 
whether the firm does or does not have market power.  The defendant’s current price should 
already be its profit-maximizing price; any increase above the current level should be 
unprofitable, even for a monopolist. 42,43
If profits were considered to be a reliable indicator of the exercise of market power, they 
might help address the market power issue.
 
44  Recall that the monopolist of Figures 14-1, 14-2, 
and 14-3 is expected to earn above-normal profits, whereas the competitors in those figures, as 
well as the Chamberlin-Robinson competitor of Figure 14-5 is expected to earn only normal 
profits.  But since the early 1980s most economists have been leery of the use of reported profit 
rates as evidence that can be used to measure the presence of market power;45
                                                 
42 Unfortunately, as White (2008) documents, the uselessness of the SSNIP test has not stopped judges in 
monopolization cases – and even some expert economists – from asking a SSNIP-type of question in these cases.  In 
the du Pont cellophane case, the U.S. Supreme Court asked it, and the majority concluded that du Pont did not have 
market power because the company could not increase its price of cellophane profitably from current levels – that du 
Pont was too constrained by competition from other flexible wrapping materials.  This inappropriate use of a 
SSNIP-type of question has since come to be known in antitrust discussions as the “cellophane fallacy”. 
 and the use of 
43 As Werden (2000) has pointed out, a SSNIP test would be appropriate if the issue that was under litigation was a 
prospective action (e.g., a proposed exclusionary action) by the defendant against which the plaintiff was seeking an 
anticipatory injunction.  In that event, the question – “Will this action create (or add to the defendant’s) market 
power?” – could be addressed by SSNIP:  “After the proposed action occurs, would the defendant (unilaterally or in 
concert with other firms) be able to achieve a SSNIP?”  But few monopolization cases involve prospective actions. 
44 In their commentary on the du Pont cellophane case, Stocking and Mueller (1955) demonstrate that du Pont’s 
profits from selling cellophane were substantially higher than the company’s profits from selling rayon, where du 
Pont faced considerably more direct competition; they argue that this indicates that du Pont was exercising market 
power and thus that cellophane, and not flexible wrapping materials, was the relevant market. 
45 For critiques of the use of profit data to indicate the presence of market power, see Fisher et al. (1983); Fisher and 
McGowan (1983); Benston (1985); and Fisher (1987).  Carlton and Perloff (2005) and Perloff et al. (2007, ch. 2) 
offer eight reasons why accounting data on profits are inappropriate and misleading for cross-section studies that 
would try to reveal the presence of market power. 
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Lerner Indexes alone won’t help, since both the monopolist of Figures 14-1, 14-2, and 14-3 and 
the Chamberlin-Robinson competitor of Figure 14-5 have Lerner Indexes that exceed 1.0. 
 Unfortunately, there have been no generally accepted market delineation paradigms for 
monopolization cases that would solve this conundrum.46
B. Antitrust policies to limit the unilateral exercise of market power. 
  The development of an appropriate 
paradigm remains as a serious need for antitrust policy and jurisprudence. 
 As was mentioned in the Introduction, there are a least five ways that antitrust policy can 
limit the unilateral exercise of market power.  We will now address these five. 
 1. Prevent/stop agreements among firms that restrict competition among them and that 
thereby allow the individual firms to continue to exercise unilateral market power.  Agreements 
among firms that restrict competition among them are often described in terms of “price fixing”: 
agreements to set the price collusively rather than allowing the competitive process and the 
market to determine the price.  To the extent that the goal of the colluders is to approximate the 
monopoly outcome of Figure 14-2, the analysis that was developed earlier in this chapter is 
relevant. 
 However, since this chapter is focused on the unilateral exercise of market power, a 
different set of agreements will be addressed: market allocation agreements.  These might also be 
                                                 
46 White (2008a) offers some suggestions.  Also, for some industries, where good price information is available and 
prices are known to vary for different localities (e.g., the retail prices for an item that is sold in many different 
metropolitan areas, or airline fares for many different city-pairs), empirical analyses – e.g., regression analyses 
where price (as the dependent variable) is regressed on a measure of seller concentration (as an indicator of the 
likelihood of the exercise of market power) and other control variables – may be able to establish that local markets 
for that item or service are relevant markets.  Many airline fare studies have established local city pairs as relevant 
markets; see, for example, Borenstein (1989, 1992).  When monopolization cases arise that involve airlines, city-
pairs are usually accepted as the relevant markets; see, for example, Edlin and Farell (2004) and Elzinga and Mills 
(2009).  Similarly, the FTC was able to establish (on the basis of price information) that “big box” office supply 
retailers in local metropolitan areas were a relevant market in its successful effort to stop the merger of Staples and 
Office Depot in 1997 (FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp 1066 [1997]; for discussion, see, for example, Baker, 1999; 
Ashenfelter et al., 2006; and Dalkir and Warren-Boulton, 2009); this same kind of information could be used to 
establish the same relevant markets if (hypothetically) a big box office supply retailer were accused of exclusionary 
monopolistic behavior (e.g., of trying to buy all of the good retail sites in a metropolitan area, so as to restrict entry 
by rival big box office supply retailers). 
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described as “live and let live” arrangements:  Firms A and B, which produce and sell similar 
products, agree to sell only within their own specified and separate geographic areas (or to their 
own specified and separate categories of customers) and not to challenge or encroach upon each 
other’s territories or customer categories.  If firms A and B are thereby the sole sellers within 
their territories (or to their customer categories), then the agreement achieves the monopoly 
outcome of Figure 14-2 for each firm, as compared with a more competitive outcome that would 
prevail in the absence of the agreement.47
 Enforcement of the American antitrust laws has long recognized the anti-social nature of 
such market allocation arrangements, and judicial opinions have deemed them to be “per se” 
violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which forbids “every contract, combination…, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce…”
 
48
 A recent manifestation of alleged non-compete agreements has arisen in the 
pharmaceuticals area.  A stylized version of such an agreement is as follows:
 
49
                                                 
47 If the two firms produce identical products and would otherwise compete directly on price without any effort to 
behave strategically (i.e., they are “Bertrand” competitors), then the competitive outcome would be that shown in 
Figure 14-2 as well. 
  Branded 
pharmaceutical Company I (for “incumbent”) has a patent on an important drug that expires in, 
say, 2015; after that date generic versions of that drug can be sold.  In 2011 generic 
pharmaceutical Company E (for “entrant”) believes that Company I’s patent is invalid and files 
an application with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to sell a generic version of the drug.  
Company I sues Company E for patent infringement.  Instead of going to trial, the two 
companies settle the suit on the following terms:  Company E agrees to delay its sale of the 
48 Arguably, the first Supreme Court condemnation of such horizontal allocation arrangements (as opposed to 
specific price-fixing agreements) came in Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. U.S., 175 U.S. 211 (1899).  In that case, the 
manufacturers of pipe agreed not to compete with each other in bidding for municipal contracts.  The Court’s 
condemnation of such horizontal non-compete arrangements has been periodically reaffirmed; e.g., in U.S. v. 
National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947); and in U.S. v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). 
49 This version will exclude a great deal of institutional detail.  For a more comprehensive analysis of these issues, 
see, for example, Bigelow and Willig (2009). 
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generic version until 2013; Company I agrees that it will not challenge Company E at that time 
and agrees to make a payment of $X million to Company E. 
 This kind of agreement certainly has the potential to preserve the market power of 
Company I.  If a patent were not involved and this was simply a payment from I to E to delay E’s 
entry into I’s market, the agreement would almost surely be condemned as a per se violation of 
the Sherman Act.  Because I’s profits as a sole seller (monopolist) will always exceed the joint 
profits of the two firms selling in the market (and at the limit, the comparison of profits is the 
monopoly/competition comparison of Figure 14-2), Company I can afford to offer a substantial 
payment to E for delay, and both companies would be better off than if E entered immediately.  
But consumers would be worse off. 
However, because a patent is involved and the true validity of the patent is a central but 
unknown feature of the agreement and because the courts have generally viewed settlements of 
lawsuits as a beneficial activity that represents a mutually agreed outcome that also economizes 
on judicial resources, the courts have generally not been hostile to these agreements, despite 
repeated challenges to these agreements by the FTC and by private plaintiffs.  Further, there are 
circumstances – related to the uncertainties that surround the validity of the patent, as well as 
uncertainties as to how long a trial would take and how much the litigation costs would be – 
where a “reverse payment”50 settlement can even make consumers better off as compared with 
the likely outcome in the absence of the settlement.51
 In the summer of 2012 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in a suit by private plaintiffs 
that challenged one such agreement, broke with a number of other circuit courts and agreed with 
 
                                                 
50 Because plaintiffs do not usually make payments to defendants to settle lawsuits, these types of settlements have 
come to be known as “reverse payments”. 
51 See Bigelow and Willig (2009) for an elaboration of this argument. 
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the plaintiffs.52
 2. Prevent/stop mergers that would otherwise allow the merged firm to exercise market 
power or to enhance existing market power.  Since 1914 Section 7 of the Clayton Act has 
empowered the FTC and the DOJ to stop mergers where “in any line of commerce in any section 
of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend 
to create a monopoly.”  As originally written, the Act stopped only mergers that were 
consummated through the acquisition of shares of stock of one company by the other; this left a 
huge loophole in the form of one company’s direct purchase of the other company’s assets 
(including its brand name).  This loophole was closed in 1950 by the Celler-Kefauver 
Amendments to the Clayton Act. 
  The difference of opinions among the circuits for a major category of antitrust 
suit may well cause the Supreme Court to decide that the time is ripe to grant an appeal and 
establish a clear approach to these kinds of suits. 
 As was discussed above, the economic analysis of the possible anticompetitive 
consequences of mergers has focused on two routes: “coordinated effects”, whereby the merger 
would allow greater oligopolistic coordination among rivals; and “unilateral effects”, whereby 
the merging firms sell competing differentiated products and there are significant numbers of 
customers of either of the merging firms that consider the products of the other firm to be their 
second choice.  In this latter case, the merged firm would have an incentive to raise its prices (as 
compared with pre-merger prices), since its partner would no longer be an independent restraint. 
This latter price-raising effect is clearest if the firm were able to identify which are the 
“trapped” customers that meet this condition; it could then practice price discrimination toward 
                                                 
52 See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation, 2012-2 CCH Trade Cases ¶77,971 (July 16, 2012) 
 28 
those customers and just raise its prices toward those customers.53  But the incentive to raise 
prices holds generally, even when price discrimination is not possible.  The strength of the 
“upward pricing pressure” (UPP)54 depends on the extent to which the merged firm is able to 
recapture the customers that the pre-merger firms would have otherwise lost from a price 
increase and the profit margins on the “companion” product to which those customers are 
diverted.  Any cost-reduction efficiencies that would accompany the merger and that would 
reduce marginal costs would offset those demand-driven upward pricing pressures, yielding a net 
UPP.55
Finally, although a unilateral effects analysis that reveals that a significant net UPP would 
arise from a proposed merger may not track exactly the competition/monopoly comparison of 
Figure 14-2, it is clearly in the same spirit:  For the customers of the merged firm, the merger 
would be accompanied by a significant increase in prices, which would be the manifestation of 
the merged firm’s increased market power (and that increase in market power would, of course, 
be registered by a higher Lerner Index for the merged firm). 
 
 3. Prevent/stop predatory behavior by a firm that can enhance its market power by 
driving rivals out of the market.  A potential strategy for a firm (the “incumbent”) that wants to 
achieve a monopoly position would be to set its prices temporarily at such low levels that all of 
its rivals are permanently driven from the market; the firm could then raise its prices to the 
                                                 
53 Of course, in addition to identifying those “trapped” customers, the firm would also have to prevent arbitrage 
between other (low-price) customers and these high-price customers and deal with the customer unhappiness that 
would arise when the discriminated-against customers learn that they are paying higher prices than are other 
customers. 
54 This is the phrase that Farell and Shapiro (2010) have popularized 
55 Also, to the extent that entry would occur in response to the net UPP or other competing firms would reposition 
their products so as to attract some of these “trapped” customers, the net UPP would be smaller. 
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monopoly level that is represented in Figure 14-2.  Such a strategy is typically described as 
“predatory pricing”.56
 The strategy is best described in terms of a necessary “investment” and then a subsequent 
“return” or “recoupment”:  The investment is the reduced profits (or actual losses) that the 
incumbent incurs while it is charging the low prices that will drive its rivals from the market; the 
return is the larger profits that the incumbent earns after the rivals have exited the market.  Thus, 
as is true for the evaluation of any investment, the size of the investment and the size of the 
return must be calculated; and, because the return occurs at a later time than the investment, a 
discount rate must be used. 
 
Finally, it is crucial that the rivals be permanently driven from the market.  If instead 
entry is easy, and potential entrants are not deterred by the possibility that the firm might again 
aggressively try to drive them from the market – perhaps because the entrants are myopic, or 
because they are strategic and believe that the incumbent can be deterred by an equal 
determination by the entrants to stay in the market – then there will be little or no return or 
recoupment.  On the other hand, if the firm can establish a reputation for being aggressive, then 
this may deter potential future entrants; or – in the case of a firm that is selling multiple products 
in multiple markets – deter potential entrants in other markets.57
 Public policy and judicial decisions with respect to predatory pricing have varied over the 
decades.  From the 1930s through the 1960s, a populist theme had a major influence on antitrust:  
 
                                                 
56 This discussion will focus on predatory pricing; but, in principle, other activities by the incumbent – excessive 
advertising or promotion, or flooding the market with capacity, or buying crucial resources in excess of reasonable 
needs – could fit the “predatory” pattern.  For a failed effort by the DOJ to prosecute an instance of alleged 
predatory flooding of capacity by an incumbent airline, see U.S. v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (2003); for an 
economics discussion of this case, see, for example, Edlin and Farrell (2004).  In addition, the exclusionary actions 
that are discussed in the following section could also be interpreted through a “predatory” lens. 
57 See, for example, Bolton et al. (2000).  Further, even if a reputation for aggressive behavior doesn’t deter entrants, 
to the extent that a firm faces strategic rivals in one or more markets, its reputation for being willing to be aggressive 
may serve to discipline those rivals and restrain them from competitive initiatives. 
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Large firms should be discouraged, regardless of efficiencies; and small firms should be 
preserved – partly for their own sake (the populist theme) and partly be cause of fears that large 
firms would drive out small firms and then be able to impose monopoly pricing (the predation 
scenario).  During the 1930s amendments to the antitrust laws strengthened the Clayton Act 
Section 2 restrictions on price discrimination (this became known as the Robinson-Patman Act 
of 1936) and amended the Sherman Act to allow the states to authorize resale price maintenance 
(through the Miller-Tydings Act of 1937).  In the former case, the intent was to prevent large 
retailers (the “chain stores”) from obtaining better wholesale prices from manufacturers than 
could smaller retailers; and in the latter case, the intent was to prevent the large retailers from 
selling at lower prices than could smaller retailers.58  Antitrust judicial decisions reflected these 
policy trends.59
 Beginning in the 1970s, however, the populist streak in antitrust receded, and an 
emphasis on encouraging competition and limiting the exercise of market power became 
stronger.
 
60  There was still a concern that predatory pricing could undo competition and create a 
monopoly.  But there was also a stronger concern that inhibitions on aggressive pricing would 
simply inhibit vigorous competition, to the detriment of consumers.61
                                                 
58 Simultaneously, economic regulation was broadened, so as to restrict competition in interstate trucking, airlines, 
and banking, and restrictions on competition in railroads were strengthened.  And for a brief period – 1933-1935 – 
the Sherman Act’s prohibition on price fixing was effectively suspended, as the National Recovery Administration 
(NRA), which was authorized by the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, negotiated and enforced codes of 
“fair competition” for industries, which effectively encouraged price fixing.  A Supreme Court decision that 
declared the NRA to be unconstitutional (Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 [1935]) ended this 
“experiment”. 
  Reinforcing this concern 
was the realization that many judicial (and regulatory) determinations of what was “below cost” 
pricing included (for multi-product firms) arbitrary allocations of fixed and overhead costs into 
59 See, for example, Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co. 386 U.S. 685 (1967); see also Adelman (1959a) and 
Levinson (2011). 
60 And, simultaneously, there was greater emphasis on deregulation and an encouragement of greater competition in 
airlines, trucking, rail, and banking. 
61 This has come to be known as the problem of “Type I errors”: the condemnation (as “predatory”) of pricing that is 
simply vigorous but competitive.  
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the unit costs that were the standard for which lower prices indicated predation.  The so-called 
“Areeda-Turner rule”,62 which established prices that are equal to or greater than marginal costs 
(with average variable costs serving as a proxy for marginal costs) as a “safe harbor” against 
charges of predation, provided important guidance for policy and for the judiciary.63,64
 Starting in the 1980s, Supreme Court decisions have taken an increasingly skeptical view 
of the likelihood of successful predation.
 
65  However, what has been missing from those 
decisions, as well as from lower court decisions, is the recognition that (as was discussed above) 
the extra benefits of the acquisition of a reputation for being aggressive may make worthwhile an 
episode of predatory pricing that otherwise appears to lack a positive investment/return profile 
(and that is thereby likely to be dismissed as merely vigorously competitive, rather than as 
potentially predatory).66
 4. Prevent/stop exclusionary behavior by a firm that can enhance its market power.  All 
enterprises rely on “upstream’ suppliers to provide them with some of their inputs; and all but 
end-of-the-chain retailers sell to “downstream” customer firms.
 
67
                                                 
62 See Areeda and Turner (1975). 
  Vertical integration by a firm 
63 Parallel efforts were being made in the regulatory arena to move pricing decisions away from “fully distributed 
costs” and toward “incremental costs”; see, for example, Baumol (1968) and Baumol and Walton (1973). 
64 The Areeda-Turner rule is clearly conservative, as a reference to Figure 14-3 demonstrates:  By pricing at the level 
of PL, the dominant firm eliminates profitable production by the fringe, even though PL is above the dominant firm’s 
marginal costs.  If this could make the fringe disappear permanently, then the dominant firm would have the entire 
market to itself, even though it would not have violated the Areeda-Turner rule. 
65 See Matsushita Electric Industrial Corp., Ltd., et al. v. Zenith Radio Corp. et al., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Brooke 
Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993); and Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons 
Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc. 549 U.S. 312 (2007).  For economics commentary on each, see, for example, Elzinga 
(1999), Burnett (1999), and Rausser and Foote (forthcoming, 2014), respectively.  For a case in which the plaintiff 
convinced an appellate court of the existence of predation, see Spirit Airlines Inc. v. Northwest Airlines Inc., 431 
F.3d 917 (2005); for an economics discussion of this case, see, for example, Elzinga and Mills (2009). 
66 Another approach that may well be worth considering is embodied in the concept of “no economic sense”: that a 
price or non-price action should be condemned if it made no economic sense for the firm that was undertaking the 
action unless the target firm (or firms) disappeared from the market or was otherwise disciplined.  See Ordover and 
Willig (1981, 1999) and Werden (2006). 
67 In the case of firms that produce and then sell finished goods to or through “distributors” (whether wholesale or 
retail), the particular legal arrangement with respect to who owns the goods at which stage can affect whether one 
would consider the distributor to be “downstream” from the producer, or whether the producer is purchasing 
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at one stage into an upstream or downstream stage may bring socially beneficial efficiencies in 
exploiting production efficiencies and/or overcoming externality problems or informational 
asymmetries; or a firm that lacks the managerial or production capabilities to integrate vertically 
into an adjoining stage may still be able to overcome the externalities or asymmetries through 
vertical contracting practices.68
However, a firm that enjoys market power at one stage may also be able to use vertical 
integration or vertical contracting practices to enhance its market power – essentially by 
restricting and/or raising the cost to rivals of access to upstream or downstream resources.
 
69
 The courts – supported by many economists’ suspicions about anticompetitive nature of 
vertical restraints – initially approached vertical restraints and even vertical integration via 
merger with substantial hostility.
  By 
raising costs to rivals, a firm is able to deflect demand to itself and thereby increase its prices and 
its profitability.  Recall that the dominant firm in Figure 14-3 benefits from actions that cause the 
fringe firms’ supply curve to shift upward. 
70  At various times, resale price maintenance, territorial 
exclusivity, exclusive dealing, and tying were branded as “per se” offenses.  However, starting in 
the 1970s, the courts have taken a more nuanced view toward vertical restraints, recognizing 
their potential efficiencies and essentially judging them under a “rule of reason”.71
                                                                                                                                                             
“distribution services” from the distributors, which would make them (at least conceptually) “upstream” from the 
producer. 
  However, a 
68 Examples of such practices include resale price maintenance (RPM), territorial exclusivity, exclusive dealing, 
exclusive dealers, full-line forcing, tying, and bundling.  Often, these vertical contracting practices (or vertical 
integration) are beneficial in dealing with free-riding problems.  This is the argument that is often advanced to 
support resale price maintenance (see, e.g., Telser, 1960), territorial exclusivity, and exclusive dealing (see, e.g., 
Marvel, 1982). 
69 As Asker and Bar-Isaac (2011) demonstrate, RPM can be seen as an effort by the incumbent to “bribe” its 
distributors to refrain from distributing a rival’s products. 
70 The story of the initial legal and economics hostility to vertical practices, and the eventual softening, is recounted 
in White (1989, 2010a, 2010b). 
71 An important early decision was Continental T.V., Inc., et al. v. GTE-Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); for an 
economics discussion of this case, see, for example, Preston (1994).  The most recent major movement in this 
direction came in the Supreme Court’s decision in 2007 to treat RPM under the rule of reason, in Leegin Creative 
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rule of reason approach does not mean that the defendant always carries the day with efficiency 
arguments, see, for example, U.S. v. Visa USA Inc., Visa International Corp., and MasterCard 
International Inc., 344 F.3d 229 (2003);72 and U.S. v. Dentsply International, Inc., 399 F.3d 181 
(2005).73
 (5) Structural dismemberment.  If a firm is found to be exercising market power – 
because it is found to have a positive Lerner Index (and thus is charging P > MC) and/or it has 
engaged in predatory/exclusionary acts – then one way to limit that exercise of market power is 
to dismember the firm: to break the firm into two or more horizontal (and viable) competitors or 
two or more vertically related entities (if vertical exclusionary acts are seen as the problem).  
This dismemberment route was the approach that the Supreme Court adopted in 1911 to DOJ 
monopolization prosecutions of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey (in Standard Oil Co. 
of New Jersey v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1 [1911]) and the American Tobacco Company (in U.S. v. 
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 [1911]).  In the decade that followed the DOJ succeeded in 
breaking up other large industrial firms that had large market shares and that appeared to be 
exercising market power. 
 
 By 1920, however, the Supreme Court backed away from this approach, refusing to find 
that the U.S. Steel Corporation was guilty of monopolization (in U.S. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 
U.S. 417 [1920]), and for the next two decades the dismemberment approach to addressing 
market power was largely abandoned. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. 581 U.S. 677 (2007).  For an economics discussion of this case, see Elzinga and 
Mills (2014 forthcoming).  Tying remains technically a per se offense; but, by insisting that a defendant possess 
market power before a tying prosecution can succeed, the Supreme Court has greatly weakened the sting of the 
apparent per se status of tying.  See, for example, Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 
(1984); for an economics discussion of that case, see, for example, Lynk (1999). 
72 For an economics discussion of this case, see, for example, Pindyck (2009). 
73 For an economics discussion of this case, see, for example, Katz (2009). 
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 In the 1940s through the 1960s, however, prosecutorial and judicial interest in this 
approach was revived.  The DOJ’s successful prosecutions of Alcoa (in U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of 
America, 148 F.2d 416 [1945]), of movie chains and distributors (in U.S. v. Crescent Amusement 
Co., 323 U.S. 173 [1944]; U.S. v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 [1948]; and U.S. v. Paramount Pictures, 
Inc. 334 U.S. 131 [1948]), of the United Shoe Machinery Corporation (in U.S. v. United Shoe 
Machinery Corp., 347 U.S. 521 [1954]),74
 Simultaneous with this revived prosecutorial and judicial interest in the dismemberment 
approach to monopolization problems was a rising academic/intellectual interest in this 
approach, which peaked in 1959 with the publication of a pro-dismemberment monograph by 
Kaysen and Turner (1959).  The Kaysen and Turner intellectual argument for a “no fault” 
approach to the dismemberment of firms that were exercising market power (which included 
oligopolies, as well as monopolies and dominant firms) rested on the findings of Bain (1951, 
1956), who showed that corporate profits (and thus the exercise of market power) were 
positively related to seller concentration (Bain, 1951)
 and the Grinnel Corporation (in U.S. v. Grinnel Corp., 
384 U.S. 563 [1966] all resulted in some divestitures of either a horizontal or vertical nature; for 
example, in Alcoa, the DOJ succeeded in requiring that Alcoa divest its Canadian subsidiary, 
Aluminium Ltd., which became an independent competitor to Alcoa. 
75
                                                 
74 For an economics discussion of this case, see Kaysen (1956). 
 and that economies of scale were 
relatively unimportant in explaining the sizes of large oligopolistic firms (Bain, 1956).  Also, an 
important argument for a structural approach was (and remains) that it is largely self-enforcing:  
Whereas a behavioral remedy requires enforcement by a federal district court judge, a successful 
structural remedy (i.e., if the additional competitors that are created by the structural remedy are 
75 Bain’s findings were replicated many times, with increasingly sophisticated econometrics, over the next two 
decades.  For summaries of these many studies, as of the early 1970s, see Weiss (1971, 1974). 
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economically viable) creates the improved competitive conditions that limit the exercise of 
market power. 
 By the 1970s and 1980s, however, many economists’ faith in the linkage between 
corporate profits as an indicator of the exercise of market power and seller concentration was 
substantially weakened,76 as was the belief that economies of scale were unimportant for 
explaining the size and profitability of major industrial firms.77  There was still evidence, based 
on price data (instead of profit data), that seller concentration and the exercise of market power 
were still positively associated.78
 One final major dismemberment was achieved by the DOJ, in a settlement of a 
monopolization case against AT&T in 1982.
  Still, the intellectual force that might have continued to sustain 
the dismemberment approach was clearly weakened. 
79
 In the 1990s, when the DOJ prosecuted Microsoft for monopolization and initially won 
its case at the federal district court level, it asked for and got the court to agree to the vertical 
dismemberment of Microsoft into an operating system (OS) company and a browser-plus-
  In this case, the DOJ’s argument that AT&T’s 
ownership of (regulated) local wire-line telephone service, long distance service, and telephone 
equipment manufacturing facilities made it difficult for rivals to enter and compete in the latter 
two areas carried the day, and the local operating companies were separated from the long 
distance and equipment facilities (and the local operating companies themselves were separated 
into seven regional companies, so as to reduce the possibility of monopsony power in their 
purchases of telephone equipment). 
                                                 
76 As was discussed, above, during this period substantial doubts were raised about the validity of reported corporate 
profits as an indicator of true “economic profits” and thus as an indicator of the exercise of market power.  In 
addition, critics raised the possibility that the higher profits that were associated with greater seller concentration 
were the result of economies of scale; see, for example, Demsetz (1973, 1974) and Mancke (1974). 
77 See, for example, Demsetz (1973, 1974) and Mancke (1974). 
78 See, for example, Weiss (1989) and Audretsch and Siegfried (1992). 
79 See U.S. v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (1982); for an economics discussion of this case, see, for example, Noll and 
Owen (1994). 
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software-applications company;80 the theory/hope was that the OS company would vertically 
integrate into browsers and applications, while the browser company would vertically integrate 
into Oss, and thus competition in both areas would increase.  However, when the case was 
appealed, the appellate court – though supporting the DOJ’s claim that Microsoft had engaged in 
monopolization – refused to endorse the dismemberment remedy and remanded the case back to 
the district court for further consideration of a remedy.81  The case was finally settled with only 
behavioral remedies and no dismemberment.82
 It seems unlikely that, in the absence of a major change in antitrust economics and legal 
sentiment, there will be any further calls for dismemberment in future monopolization cases 
brought by the DOJ. 
 
 
IV. Conclusion. 
 Monopoly and the dominant firm continue to be an important and interesting area for 
antitrust policy and jurisprudence, as well as for antitrust economics.  Although the basic 
concepts of monopoly and the exercise of market power are clear – at least in antitrust economics 
– the identification of monopoly and the issue of what to do about it when it is identified remain 
as contentious issues.  Especially troubling is the absence of a clearly developed paradigm for the 
delineation of a market in most monopolization cases; without a paradigm, plaintiffs will always 
argue for arbitrarily narrow markets, defendants will argue for arbitrarily broad markets, and the 
judiciary will have little basis for choosing among arbitrary alternatives.  Further, the separation 
of hard-nosed, vigorous competition with respect to price and other attributes from predatory 
                                                 
80 See U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (1999); 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (2000); and 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (2000). 
81 See U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (2001). 
82 See U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144 (2002).  For an economics discussion of this case, see, for 
example, Rubinfeld (2009). 
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behavior, and the tradeoffs between the greater efficiencies that can be brought by vertical 
restraints and the exclusionary effects of those restraints, will remain as contentious issues for 
antitrust economics and jurisprudence. 
 In sum, monopoly and the dominant firm remain as an interesting area for antitrust. 
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Figure 14-1: A Simple Comparison of Monopoly and Competition 
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Figure 14.2: A More Complex Comparison of Monopoly and Competition 
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Figure 14.3: The Dominant Firm and the Reactive Fringe 
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Figure 14-4: The Cost Curves for a Technology That Has Economies of Scale 
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Figure 14.5: The “Tangency” Equilibrium for a Chamberlin-Robinson Competitor 
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